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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LOCAL REALTY COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Plaiintiff and Appellant,
No. 6004

vs.
V. A. LINDQUIST and MARY
LINDQUIST, his Wife,
Defendants and Respondents.
BRIKF' OF
Introd~tction:

RF~SPONDENTS

Respondents accept the Statement

of "B'acts, FindingR of F'act and Conclusions of Law, and
the Judgment printed in Appellant's brief.
On page 8 of Appellant's brief is stated the question of law which Appellant asserts is involved in
this case. We submit that such statement is inaccurate.
The real question, we bPlieve, would more nearly be
stated thus:
Is the purchaser at execution sale entitled to
recover rPnt from the mortgagor-owner for the
latter's use and ocrupation during the redemption period 1
In

th(~

lower courts it was stipulated that if a

receiver had heen appointed during the redemption
pc>riod in this casP, the value of his services in caring

4
for the property would be tantamount to rentals
claimed by Appellant-Purchaser, and further, that Respondents, during said period, took as good care of
the property as a receiver would have done.
ARGUMT,~NT

1.

A

1\lORTGAGOR-0\VNI~R

THE RIGHrr TO

POSSms~SION

HAS

TITL~

AND

OF HIS PROPERTY

THROUGHOUT THE REDIGMPTTO,\'

PER I 0 D

1

1

WITHOU'l PAYMENT OF RENT.
It is elementary in a "Lien" State (Utah) that

the mortgagor has title throughout thP redemption
perod, appellant's novel
21 of its brief, to

thf~

revenm~

stamp argument, page

contrary notwithstanding. Our

Court is not conc<>rned with the construction the Collector of Internal

RPvPnu<~

places on our statutes. The

Utah cases and many of appellant's authoritiPs establish that title does not pass until sheriff's deed.
Occupation without payment of rent is an mmd~~nt

to mortgagor's rig·hts. Under 104-37-37, purchaser

at execution sale might bP Pntitled to a profit, proceed, rent or income extra the occupation and use.
Holmes v. GmvPnhorst, 263 N. Y. 148, 188 N.

E. 285, 1933.

If Lindquists had rented a room or the g·arage in our
principal case, there may be a basis in equity for
turning· the "proceeds" ovPr to thP appellant. But it

5
1s submittPd that this is aR far as 104-37-37 could go.
At le,ast it is as far a.s any case cited by Appellant
qoes. We are concPrnPd with whether the mortgagor-

ownPr in possPssion during redemption is to be burdPned with payment of rent for his own occupation and
use. Examin inp; appellant's authorities either factually
or b? dPcision, we find no caRe requiring such payment
for hiR own occupation and nsP. In the order cited by
Ap]wllant, thP caRe of:
Pann Morf,qaqr Loan Co. v. Pettet, 200 N. W.
4-97, 36 A. L. R. 598, 1924, concPrns the appointment of a rpceiver and dPrides North Dakota
RtatutPR entitle thP mortgagor to thP rentR and
profits and poRseRRion of thP property,

Reynolds v. 0nthr·op, 7 Cal. 4-3, is not pertinent
since it involves recovery h? the purchaser from
a third party leRs·eP of th<> mortgagor-owner.
M cDe1•itt 1•. SuUivan, 8 Cal. 593, iR inapplicable
for thP Rame r<>aRon,

Harris v. Reynolds. 13 Cal. 515. 73 Am. Dec.
600, 1Rfl9, is not pertinPnt, Rinre Harris did not

suP Rf~vnoldR for rPnt bnsed on the latter·s
own ocdupntion. hut mPrely for "profits" nccrninp; through salPs of watH,
Hill v. Tmtlor. 22 CaL 191, is not in point, the
plaintiff merely prayim~· for appointment of a
rPceiver to eollcet profits, not praying for rentals hnsN1 on defendant's own occnpntion nnd
URP,
TV alker v. McCusker, 71 Cal. 594, 12 P. 723, is
not pertinPnt for thP rPason thnt plnintiff seeks

recovery from a third party other than the
mortgagor-owner,
Cla.rke v. Cobb, 121 Cal. 595, 54 P. 74, does not
apply sinre recovery is sought from a third
party lessee,
Shintaffer v. Bank of Italy, 13 P. (2d) 668, 1932,
does not apply since plaintiff sued for crops
receiv(~d as "rc>n t" by the mortgagor from his
lessc>e,
First Nat·iotwl Tn1sf v. Staley, 25 P. (2d) 982.
Hl33, is inapplicablP since it sc>eks to collect
rents, thc>rc~ being no prayer for rent for the
mortgagor's own occupation and use, and
Clifford v. Henry, 169 N. W. 508, 1918, is not
applicable since it was for r0cov0ry of crops
by way of rent.

ApparPntly counsc>l for appella11t misintPrprd tlw
facts of our principal case. They Prroneously attempt
to categorize our casu by (·itation of authority not m
point. CarPfu] analysis of the
d(~cision

cas(~

reveals no fact or

bringing our case within appellant's author-

ities. H arr·is v. Reynolds, supra, the backbone of appellant's theory and the backbreaker of mortgagors if
appellant be corrPct, does not solve our problem. Attention is dirPctPd to the following companion cases,
carefully omitt0d by appellants, for a factual understanding of Harris v. Reynolds:

Raun v. Reynolds, 11 Cal. 15,
Reynolds v. Harris, 14 Cal. 668,
RatM1 v. Reynolds, 15 Cal. 460,
Rattn v. Reynolds, 18 Cal. 27G, and
Harris v. Reynolds, supra.

.
7
From these

rr~lat<~d

casPs it appears that Reynolde

mortgaged to Harris' assignor. Default and foreclosure
ensued. In tlw words of Reynolds v. H ar1·is, 14 Cal. 668
at page 677, Harris sued Reynolds "to obtain a 1"eceiver of the rents and profits pending the time of redemption. In this action (Harris v. Reynolds) the District Court comJwlled Reynold8 (in possession) to pay
the PROCIGEDS of the canals into court during the
time allow<•d for redemption; and after the time for
redemption had Pxpin•d aud Harris had obtained his
de<~d

the Court rendered final judgment in favor of

Harris and din•ctPd that tlw money in Court (collected
from third pa rtics) bP paid over to him." Nowhere
in these cnse>s is there> a suggestion or prayer thnt
Reynolds, tlw mortgagor-ownPr in posse!'sion, be required to pay rent for his own occupation. Only "profits," or "rentals," or "collections" wPre prayed for.
Reynolds wns treated as a "truste>e." Numerous othPr
phrases iu the cases indicate that it was something
over and above mere occupation and

U8<~

by the mort-

gagor for which the plaintiff was prayiug, and about
which the court was talking. In one of the cases, Reynolds
be

retriev<~d

correct,

what he had paid ovPr. If ruppellant.

Reynolds

could

"tenant in p<msession" for

have
Ui:il~

sued

Harris

as

and occupation by

Harris, but such was not attempted.

W<• tug<' at this point 1lwt Proposition II on pagr

8
22 of appellant's brief is a generallty based on false
logic. No case cited warrants a construction including
the facts of our principal case.
II.

SECTION 104-37-37 R. S. U. 1933 DOES NOT

APPLY TO A MORTGAGOR-OWNER IN POSSESSION DURING RF.DEMPTTON PERIOD.
A.

This seems to be born out by the Utah Cases:
McLaughlin v. Park City Bank, 63 Pac. 589,
1900. 22 Utah 473.
'
Carlquist v. Coltha'rp, 248 Pac. 481, 67 Utah
514.

In the McLaughlin cas<>, decided in 1900, Sec. 10437-37 then operative, one Cupit, judgment creditor,
caused execution to issue and petitioned thP Court to
require the

rec<~iver,

who represented the debtor-owner

m possession, to account for rents, etc. With respect
to liability for rents, occupation and use during the
redemption period the case is squarely in point with
our principal cas·e. The Court, among other things,
said:
"
The real estate in controversy was
rightfully held by the receiver with the right
to the use, rents, and profits thereof for the
benefit of the estate until Cupit should acquire
title by sale on his execution . . . . An execution
creditor is not entitled to possession and rents
of the property levied upon before sale and before the time for ·redemption has expired . . . .
Under such circumstances Cupit had no rig·ht to
chargP thP rec<:>iver with the rPnts an<l use of

•
the premist~s, which at most would about cover
thr> expPnse of opPrating and keeping the building, Pte. in repair.''
In the Ca•rlquist case, 1926, after deciding that the
mortgagor had title throughout the redemption period,
the Court refutes ev0n the doctrine of Harris v. Reynolds. ThE> Court states that the mortgagor, being en-

titled to tlw poss<>ssion of prt>mises, "as a necessary
corollary" is r>ntitlPd to thP crops grown therPon, i.e.,
takes thP view that as long as the mortgagor is entitled to posspssion, he is entitled as a corollary, to
the crops grown during· his right of possession.

III. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER FORECLOSURE DECREE ARE NO'r NECESSARILY DETER~fiNED BY THE ST ATUTFJS ON EXFJCUTION.
A.

Mortgage statutes are separate and distinct

from the Pxecution statute. 104-55-1 R. S. U. 1933 says:
"Tlwre can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right
secured by mortgage upon real f~state or personal property, which action must be in accordancP with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due .
. . . and din~cting the sheriff to proc0ed and sell
the same aceording to the provisions of law n~
latinq to sales on execution.
Does

the last sPntence nwan

"procedur<~"

of

sal(~ 1

a

'' nwthod '' or

DoPs it also mean that substan-

tive rights of tlw parties arP d<'terminablP hy tlw exe-

"-''

10
cution

statute~

W c submit that the execution statutes

govern the mPchanics of obtaining title, but not neces~arily

the substantiv<> rights of the parties.

The estab-

lished principles of ownership, rig·ht to possession and
the incidental rights to rents, profitR and the like, we
believe, are l0ft to the gpneral law, i. e., that in this
reRp<>ct the mortgag·e aml exeeution Rtatutf's are mutually exclusive.
In conclusion, we

~uhmit

that: The appellant has

cited no authority for his poRition; that our Court has
conRtrued 104-37-37 to exclude a mortgagor-owner in poss<>;;;sion; that ex<>cution statutes ne0d not be interpreted
to govern substantive rights in mortg·age situations, and
that to require payment of rent by the mortgagor-owner
would encourage him to vacate immediately upon foreclosure, would discourage

n~dcmption,

lead to waste and

depreciation, cause indiRcriminate trespass, vandalism,
would require mortgagee to employ a caretaker though
hP has no right of pos;;;ession, would put words in the
statute which do not exist, and would place upon our
statute a eonstruction not based on any cih•d authority.
RPspectfully submitted,

F'. HENRI

H:F~NRTOD,

Attonwy for Defendants and Respondents.

